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VOTE.COM AND INTERNET POLITICS:
A COMMENT ON DICK MORRIS'S VERSION
OF INTERNET DEMOCRACY
PaulM. Schwartz*
A much sought-after political advisor, Dick Morris is also a successful Internet entrepreneur. His popular website VOTE.com sponsors informal polls on political issues and hosts discussion of nonpolitical topics such as travel, technology, business, and sports.
Already 1.2 million people have registered at this site, which also
features insightful analysis of politics by Morris. As Morris has designed VOTE.com, when one votes on a discrete opinion poll, an email is sent to the concerned political leaders. As an example, the
result of the pre-election poll, "Is George W. Bush Smart Enough to
be President?" was forwarded to both George W. Bush and Al Gore.'
As I will discuss below, however, this fashion of testing public
opinion is loaded with troubling forms of systematic bias.
In DirectDemocracy and the Internet, Dick Morris assumes yet
another role, that of Internet prophet. Yet, his provocative essay
demonstrates that even the most politically astute observer faces difficulties in predicting the Internet's impact on the future of American
politics. In his essay, as well as in his recently published book
VOTE.con, Morris portrays a dramatically improved post-Internet
political landscape, which he develops in three predictions.

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful for comments
on this Essay by Christine Daigneault, Edward Jacob Janger, Eli Richman, Stefanie Schwartz, and Peter J. Spiro. Helpful responses to it were also made by
participants at the "Internet Voting and Democracy" Symposium at Loyola
Law School and, in particular, by my co-panelists Elizabeth Garrett and Dick
Morris.
1. See Is George Bush Smart Enough to be President?, VOTE.com, at
http://www.vote.com/archivevotes.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2000).
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First, Morris forecasts cheaper elections due to the Internet's influence.2 Second, he argues that the move of the electoral franchise
online will encourage greater voter participation. 3 Third, Morris believes that the general movement of politics from television to the
Internet will stimulate an evolution of our system of governance to a
more direct form of democracy. 4 In a burst of enthusiasm, Morris5
concludes his essay with these words, "Democracy is on its way."
This language echoes, in an unintended fashion no doubt, Leonard
Cohen, who, in the chorus
of a 1992 song, promised, "[d]emocracy is
6
coming to the U.S.A.",
In this Essay, I examine each of Morris's three predictions in
turn and find them contestable. Like Morris, however, I am unable
to resist the role of cyberspace seer and throughout this paper will
speculate on the Internet's likely impact on democratic self-rule in
the United States. My conclusions are generally pessimistic. I am
skeptical that political use of the Internet in the United States will
stimulate cheaper elections or lead to broader-based voter participation. As a normative matter, moreover, I am doubtful as to the glories of greater direct democracy through use of Internet referenda.
Finally, I identify one additional point for pessimism, the impact of
Internet politics on information privacy. Yet, the Internet, like our
political system, is malleable. The question for the future is how we
might shape cyberspace and the political process on it to avoid negative and encourage positive results from any move to online politics.
I. MORE EXPENSIVE ELECTIONS

Morris observes that the Internet is growing at a time when the
television audience is shrinking. As the use of the Internet expands,
Morris predicts that politicians will follow voters by "shifting their
focus from on-air to online." 7 Morris depicts the relationship between politicians and the governed through a stark metaphor of
2. See Dick Morris, Direct Democracy and the Internet, 34 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1033, 1041-42 (2001).
3. See id. at 1051-52.
4. See id. at 1033-34.
5. Id. at 1053.
6. LEONARD COHEN, "DEMOCRACY"

1992).
7. Morris, supra note 2, at 1033.

ON THE FUTURE
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predatory lions and their victims. As he memorably states, "[1]ike
hunting lions who must follow the migration of the antelopes on
whom they feed, political campaigns will haveS no choice but to
transfer the bulk of their attention to the Intemet."
In his essay, Morris has identified an important emerging trend,
which is the rise of the Internet as a force in politics. His conclusion
is that the Internet will reduce the cost of elections; this verdict appears, in my judgment, to be unlikely. Morris argues, "It]his trend
[of recourse to the Internet] will decrease the reliance on large financial contributors and will reverse the long-term trend toward more
and more expensive campaigns." 9 In fact, the best current evidence
suggests both that the combination of politics and the Internet will
heighten the long-term trend towards more expensive elections and
that large financial contributors will remain welcome and influential.
While the use of the Internet is growing, the critical issue is the
fashion in which the Internet contributes to a fragmentation of media
sources that, paradoxically enough, makes advertising on remaining
mass media as important, or even more important, than ever before.
As a firther trend, convergence between the Internet and television is
likely to increase fragmentation and make it more expensive to reach
any given number of viewers, or in Internet parlance, "eyeballs." Finally, convergence is also being accompanied by increasing media
concentration in cyberspace, and this long-term trend is also likely to
increase the cost of political campaigns. Morris does note the trend
of fragmentation; he observes that the Internet offers a "democratization of the flow of information [that] is rapidly eroding the power
bases of journalistic baronies" throughout the nation.'0 He misses,
however, the fashion in which the very fragmentation of the Internet
is strengthening the appeal of the remaining-splintered-mass media, in particular broadcast television and cable. Only these media
currently deliver the mass audience, or, stated with more precision,
the more or less neatly segmented groups that modem political campaigns seek to influence through advertising. Indeed, campaigns in
the 2000 election cycle are relying on television and cable advertisements as never before.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1033-34

10. Id. at 1044.
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The New York Senate race between Hillary Clinton and Rick
Lazio illustrates this heightened reliance on mass media. Both candidates waged their campaigns through targeted advertising based on
whether a television slot offered access to male, middle-aged viewers, or senior citizens, or young females. As the New York Times
summarizes, "[t]he decisions about where to put commercials are
among the most important in any campaign because television advertising, in many ways, is the campaign, consuming at least half of
a typical candidate's total spending.,!! Thus, Morris is correct to
point to the Internet's fragmentation of media sources, but the result
of this development is to make mass media advertising more important than ever before. This situation is already contributing to the
high cost of election campaigns this year.
In the future, moreover, the Internet is likely to become assimilated to the expensive, mass marketing model that we find at present
in broadcast television and cable. Simply put, a movement is underway to make the Internet more like the old network-centric world.
Due to a convergence of technology and concentration in ownership
of content and infrastructure, advertising on the Internet will become
more expensive at precisely the same time it becomes more important for politicians.
The AOL-Time Warner merger provides a clear example of
these trends in cyberspace. AOL is the leading Internet service provider with twenty-nine million subscribers in the United States; Time
Warner provides both media content and high speed cable lines
serving 12.5 million customers. 2 In the aftermath of their planned
merger, a combined AOL-Time Warner will control a large subscriber base, rich content, and, perhaps most importantly of all, fast
broadband connections. This company is interested not only in
bringing the Internet to its customers over cable lines, but in linking
online content and television programs through its "AOLTV" product.' 3 AOLTV is an interactive service that brings AOL features and
11. Felicity Barringer, Spending So Much to Sway So Few, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2000, at 37 (emphasis added).
12. See Edward Robinson, AOL's PipeDream, BUSINESS2.COM, Oct.
10, 2000, at http://www.business2.com/contentlmagazine/indepth/2000/09/29/
20136.
13. See What is AOLTV, at http://www.aol.com/anywhere/aoltv/whatis.html
(last visited Jan. 18, 2000).
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services to members' TV sets; it enables them to access their e-mail,
send instant messages, and surf the Internet from their TV.
Eben Moglen and Pam Karlen have aptly described the consequences of developments such as the AOL-Time Warner merger in
The Soul of a New PoliticalMachlzne.14 As Moglen and Karlen note,
[M]edia organizations have sought to bring the Internet under their control by reducing the technology's power for
equalizing communications opportunities, recreating in the
telecommunications infrastructure of the net the "broadcaster-consumer" model previously imposed on the electromagnetic spectrum, in which a few dominant
voices
5
speak and the rest of society merely listens.1
Companies that control these new "broadcast-consumer" areas of the
Internet will try to keep their viewers within their sphere of influence.
Walls are likely to go up on parts of previously unfenced areas
of cyberspace to keep consumers from wandering off. This attempt
to return to the broadcaster-consumer model has many implications;
if this activity is only partially successful, it will increase the cost of
political advertising on the new, mass media areas on the Internet.
As Elizabeth Garrett has noted, the cost of reaching parties in the
remaining fragmented areas of the Internet is likely to involve tapping the expertise of a new breed of expensive specialists. 16 She
writes, "Sophisticated use of this new technology... will depend on
expertise, and in most cases, candidates wvill not possess such expertise and may not be able to obtain it through volunteers." 17 Garrett
foresees a continuing influence in the realm of Internet8 politics for
savvy political operatives as well as for political parties.'
A final fashion in which the Internet will raise election expenditures is through its increasing exploitation as a fundraising tool. A
rational political candidate is not like the purchaser in a typical
14. Eben Moglen & Pam Karlen, The Soid of a New PoliticalMachine: The
Online, The Color Line, and Electronic Democracy, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv.

1089 (2001).
15. Id. at 1097-98.
16. See Elizabeth Garrett, PoliticalIntermediariesand the Internet Revolittion, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1055, 1059 (2001).
17. Id.
18. See id.

1076

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[34:1071

market, who will seek to purchase a particular item for the lowest
cost possible. Rather, the rational political candidate is likely to seek
to maximize the size of her campaign budget. The payoff for a candidate will be not only in winning an election, but in increased name
recognition, which is useful in the overall process of governance.
Thus, to the extent that political cash raised on the Internet would
otherwise not be tapped, this money will increase total expenditures
during campaigns.
Some evidence exists that politicians are already using the Internet in a fashion that will raise overall expenditures. One historical
moment in the Internet's emergence as a fundraising vehicle came
during Senator John McCain's "cyber-fundraisers," an element of his
19
unsuccessful campaign for the Republican presidential nomination.
After a nineteen point victory in the New Hampshire primary, Senator McCain was able to use his website to raise millions in a relatively short period. In fact, on the night of his New Hampshire victory, McCain was collecting donations at the rate of $20,000 an hour
via credit card donations at his campaign's website. 20 Note, however, that people only knew about this website because McCain had
used appearances on television and advertisements in traditional media to publicize its existence. 21 Here, we have another indication of
the likely continuing importance of existing electronic media.
Despite the Internet's use as a fundraising tool, it is nevertheless
unclear whether it will decrease politicians' reliance on large financial contributors. To return to the McCain example, the failure of his
challenge to George W. Bush, the candidate of the Republican establishment, also marked a triumph for old-style fundraising. Although
Bush raised money through the Internet, he also relied upon preInternet techniques. One of his old fashioned fundraising appeals involved asking 200 "Pioneers" to raise $100,000 each. The Pioneers
did so by telephoning friends, writing letters, and "gather[ing] checks

19. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Courting Web-Head Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2000, at 4.

20. See id.
21. See James Fallows, Internet Illusions, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 16,

2000, at 28, 29; Jonathan GS Koppell, Where's the Revolution?, INDUSTRY
STANDARD, Mar. 6, 2000, available at http://www.thestandard.com/article
/display/0,1151,12538,00.html.
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with a lot of zeroes." 22 Corporate and special interest groups also
contributed money to the Bush campaign through such traditional
appeals.
The cost of political campaigning is likely to remain high. In
Mark Danner's gloomy appraisal, "American politicians have been
forced to become a species of bagmen who collect money from the
wealthy and deliver it to television in order to sell themselves to the
voters." 23 According to Danner's assessment, political advertising
this year will enrich the major networks and broadcast stations alone
by $600 million. 24 Lavish spending is also taking place for advertisements on cable stations. Politicians are spending on this election
at a rate that exceeds that of previous campaigns. 25 In fact, near the
end of this election cycle, candidates began to worry about inadequate broadcast time to air their advertisements. 26 As Business Week
observed, "Too many campaigns are chasing too few ad slots." 27 At
last, we see a possible contribution of the Internet: cyberspace \vill
offer endless space for political advertising. In the future, the Internet is likely to be assimilated into the machinery of election campaigning and will contribute to the increasing costs of campaigning.
II. GREATER (MARGINAL) ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION FOR
HIGHER Soclo-ECONOMIc GROUPS

Beyond predicting cheaper elections, Morris asserts that the migration of the electoral franchise to online voting will stimulate
greater voter participation. As an indication of this trend, Morris
points to the online voting experiment in this year's Arizona Democratic primary. Morris concludes, "[w]hen voting online becomes
part of a seamless web of participation through online voting on issues, the electorate will find new enthusiasm for the political
22. Van Natta, supra note 19, at 4.
23. Mark Danner, The Shame ofPoliticalTV,N.Y. REv. BOOKs, Sept. 21,
2000, at 101.
24. See id.
25. See Ruth Marcus, U.S. CampaignsFuel $3Billion in Spending, WASH.

POST, Nov. 6, 2000, at Al.
26. See Lorraine Woellert & Tom Lowry, A Political Nightmare: Not
EnoughAirtime, Bus. WK., Oct. 23, 2000, at 110, 112.
27. Id.; see also Leslie Wayne, Air Time is at Premium as Election Drms

Near, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at A30 (discussing the shortage of airtime for
political advertising).
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process. ' 28 Cyber-voting will help reverse the trend of electoral
apathy. My prediction here is more cautious: in my view, a move to
online voting will lead to marginally greater rates of electoral participation for nonvoting holdouts in higher socioeconomic groups.
The low rate of participation in voting in the United States does
more than reflect poorly on our civic virtue-it raises a threat to the
legitimacy of American democracy. Frank I. Michelman's careful
normative justification of voting helps explain the nature of this
threat. Michelman attributes the American attachment to Election
Day to rough intuitions of necessity and rough intuitions of human
dignity and autonomy. 29 With reliance on John Rawl's work, he
terms this result a matter of "pure procedural justice." 30 Michelman
writes, "Political disagreements arise, and sometimes they have to be
resolved-formerly, officially-so that the country and its people
31
can get on with their lives."
As fewer and fewer people participate in the franchise, however,
there can be less of a sense that political disagreements have been resolved and that we can get on with our lives. Here we see that
Michelman's work can be used to identify the danger of the low rate
of electoral participation. As a consequence of this state of voter
apathy, our leaders may increasingly rely on what Michelman terms
a "substantive sense" of the majority.32 As he portrays this concept,
it lacks appeal.
The substantive majority is a largely inchoate body, a "silent
majority," that ambitious leaders can conjure up and that can be used
to exclude others. The danger is that under an ever-declining rate of
voter participation, electoral results will matter less than the "sensibility" of the so-called substantive majority. Politicians will compete
not only to win elections, but in a continuous process of convincing
the masses that they have best identified and translated the spirit of
the substantive majority into the spirit of the laws.
The promise of Internet voting is to increase electoral participation and thereby bolster the normative role of the franchise that
28. Morris, supra note 2, at 105 1-52.
29. See Frank I. Michelman, Why Voting?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 985, 999

(2001).

30. Id. at 998.
31. Id. at999.
32. See id. at 989-90.
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Michelman identifies-that is, the procedural role of voting. In my
view, however, online voting is likely only to increase voting at the
margin, and, at that, only by reducing the number of holdouts in
groups already more likely to vote. Moreover, similar to initiatives
such as Motor Voting Registration and Voting-by-Mail, online voting may prove unlikely to reverse the overall trend of diminishing
electoral participation. In the November 2000 election, for example,
overall voter turnout was only marginally greater than that in 1996despite nearly $1 billion spent alone on campaign television advertisements. 33 Voter turnout in that election year remained considerably lower than for the 1992 presidential election.
To understand my gloomy conclusion about Internet voting, we
can utilize a model from public choice theory to cast light on the dynamics of voting. In examining disappointing electoral participation
in the United States, public choice scholars have examined the issues
of both, "Why don't people vote?" and "Why do people vote?' 34 In
answering these questions, the scholars have raised "the paradox of
voting." This term refers to the puzzle that many Americans still
vote although: (1) virtually no one expects that her vote will affect
the outcome of an election, and (2) voting itself is not "costless," as
it takes time to cast a ballot, and, for those who are conscientious, to
find out how they should vote. 35 Under this framework, Internet
voting has the potential to lower the "costs" of electoral participation. It reduces the necessary investment in the time that it takes to
cast a ballot or to find out information that will help one decide for
whom to vote. Yet, this cost reduction only takes place for those
who are already connected to the information superhighway.
At precisely this point, however, the "digital divide" emerges as
a potent factor. This term refers to the uneven distribution of Internet access in the United States. 36 In general, Internet access at
33. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Voter Turnout Stays Low Despite Barrage of
Ads, Closeness ofRace, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2000, at A16.
34. For a concise summary, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAW 64-72 (1997).
35. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 24-25 (1991).
36. For a recent survey, see HARLAN LEBO, THE UCLA INTERNET REPORT:
SURVEYING THE DIGITAL FUTURE 11-15 (2000), at http'//wwv.ccp.ucla.edu/
pages/intemet-report.asp.
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present tracks socio-economic status, and the digital divide may last
as long as another generation. A Pew Foundation survey recently
found, for example, that fifty-seven percent of those currently without Internet access do not plan to get it.37 As a result of this disparity
in Internet access, cyber-voting will have the greatest positive impact
on the "costs" for the Internet "haves," that is, those who already
have access to the Internet. Yet, those who have access to the Internet are likely to belong to social groups that are more likely to
vote-groups of higher socio-economic status.
Under this analysis, a move to Internet voting appears to be a
modest policy for reaching holdouts in groups already more likely to
vote. In their review of existing empirical studies of Motor-Voter
and Voting-by-Mail reforms, and their own analysis of the Arizona
online voting experiment, R. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler
reach the same conclusion. Alvarez and Nagler conclude that as
"voting is made easier, it is those who already tend to vote who will
take advantage of the easier voting." 38 While we might otherwise be
ready to rejoice over every extra vote, the reforms of Motor-Voter
and Voting-by-Mail, as Alvarez and Nagler note, have proved unable
to narrow the turnout gap between those of different socio-economic
status. 39 Indeed these attempts to increase flexibility in registration
and voting mechanisms have been unable, at least so far, to reverse
the overall downward trend of voting participation. 40 The procedural
justification for voting, and, more generally, the norm of democracy
as an ongoing participatory and electoral process is unlikely to receive much assistance from Internet voting.

III.

THE DuBIous CHARMS OF INTERNET DIRECT DEMOCRACY

The final element in Morris's optimistic vision for the Internet
concerns its heightening of direct democracy. He predicts, "[The
37. See AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, Who's
Not Online: 57% of Those Without Internet Access Say They Do Not Plan to

Log On 2 (2000), at http://www.pewintemet.org/ reports/toc.aspReport=21.
38. R. Michael Alvarez & Jonathan Nagler, The Likely Consequences of
Internet Votingfor PoliticalRepresentatives,34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1115, 1126
(2001).
39. See id. at 1122-26.
40. See

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED

HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 315

(2000).
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Internet] will likely usher in a new era of more direct control of public decisions by the voters themselves and will probably further constrain the discretion of our elected officials in making decisions adverse to those sanctioned by public approval."'41 This process will
occur because the public will have access to more information and
public officials will be more obedient to online polls. In particular,
Morris seems to have in mind a heightened influence for online polls,
such as those that VOTE.com, his website, provides. Morris predicts
that these polls will intimidate politicians into obedience to the vox
populi. He writes, "[v]oters know they are being consulted, know
they voted, become engaged in the decision, and will vent their anger
42
at any of their elected representatives who ignore their wishes.
Although such polls will not be legally binding, they will be "politically binding."43
The nonbinding kind of Internet poll that Morris has in mind is
likely to be less of a boon than he expects. At least four objections
are possible to them. First, as long as we have a digital divide, we
face a problem of inherently tainted results in any Internet opinion
poll. Moreover, this taint is especially problematic because it moves
results in favor of already favored socio-economic groups. Beyond
the digital divide, a second objection to Internet opinion polls is that,
to the extent that they rely on any kind of self-reporting, inaccuracies
in the sampling of public desires are inevitable. The classic example
of such a sampling flaw came in the newspaper poll before the Roosevelt-Landon election of 1936 that asked people to write in their
choice for the presidency. The result was a resounding victory for
Landon.44 To be sure, in a nation with low voting participation in official elections, a kind of sampling issue also arises. As I have noted,
the danger of the low rate of electoral participation is that it may
make our official elections seem less important, and therefore less
decisive in resolving political issues. Yet, this difficulty will only be
exacerbated when we face the issue of whether myriad online polls
have resolved or not resolved any given issue.
The third difficulty with an online poll is the "framing effect."
41. Morris, supranote 2, at 1046.
42. Id. at 1049.
43. Id.
44. See Eric Pace, George H. Gallup is Dead at 82; Pioneer in Public
Opinion Polling,N.Y. TaMEs, July 28, 1984, at 1.
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A frame is a particular fashion in which a choice is described. 45 Beginning with the path-breaking research of Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, social psychologists have identified the pervasive
impact of reference points in shaping decisions. 46 A classic example
concerns the way in which people are more desirous of preventing
loss than promoting gain and will favor options that are framed to
emphasize this inclination.47 A frame can also be shaped to build on
information that people find more, rather than less, salient. Consider
in this regard a poll at VOTE.com that inquires whether or not Vice
President Gore's behavior in the final presidential debate was "obnoxious. ' '48 Each choice, yes and no, is quite literally "framed" by a
box with additional information. The "pro" box states, "the Democratic nominee acted like a bully so much that former first lady Bar'4 9
bara Bush told ABC that she was worried he would 'hit' her son.
Thus, our vote in this poll is framed by our feelings about concepts
such as "former first lady" and boys hitting other boys. Those who
shape the frames for online polling will have a powerful role in influencing outcomes.
My fourth and final concern is that Internet polling will be as
open to influence by special interests as direct democracy has proven
to be in the offline world. Despite the heroic image of grassroots
movements shaping referenda, the reality is frequently quite different. Public choice theorists have made us aware of the extent to
which special interests seek to capture influence through "rentseeking" in the legislative process. In a similar fashion, direct democracy can be open to manipulation. Consider this example of top
down use of the referendum process in the offline world: Paul Allen,
one of the cofounders of Microsoft and a billionaire, purchased the
45. See PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & RICHARD J. GERRIG, PSYCHOLOGY AND
LIFE 355 (15th ed. 1999).
46. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 456 (1981).
47. Thus, Program A (save money by insulating your house) will be less
effective in motivating people than Program B (stop losing money every day
through lack of insulation). See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 12931 (7th ed. 1994).
48. See Was Al Gore Obnoxious in the Final Presidential Debate?,
VOTE.com, at http://www.vote.com/vote/18243621/ (last visited Jan. 26,

2001).
49. Id.
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Seattle Seahawks football team and sought to obtain public financing
of a new football stadium that would cost approximately $425 million.50 Allen spent $6.3 million on a professional campaign to obtain
the signatures necessary for a ballot referendum regarding the construction and to campaign for its approval. 5 1 In addition, he paid almost $4 million for the special election itself, that is, he footed the
multimillion dollar cost of polling Washington state voters on this issue. 52 The referendum was held only slightly more than a month after the Washington Secretary of State and the Seahawks worked out
this reimbursement agreement. 53 The measure passed with fifty-one
percent of the votes with only slightly more than half of eligible vot54
ers participating.
For even a nonbillionaire such as myself, it is obvious that it is
worth spending less than eleven million to be able to gain control of
$425 million of "Other People's Money." This example also demonstrates that those who have earned billions in cyberspace are already
seeking to influence the process of lawmaking-and not just through
rent-seeking from the legislative branch. Most crucially, it demonstrates that direct democracy is as open to top-down influence as the
legislative process. Just as election professionals are now hired to
gather signatures and to "sell" proposed direct lawmaking to the
public through mass media advertising, we can expect a new breed of
such consultants to be available to shape the process of online voting.
The role of concerned reformers, including scholars who study the
Internet, must be to think about how to limit the real dangers of this
process on the Internet.
IV. PRIVACY PROBLEMS
For Morris, the political campaigns of the future will take place
through personalized means such as targeted e-mail. Morris writes,
"[n]ow that over 100 million Americans have e-addresses, the
55
potential for targeted, free communication via e-mail is enormous."
50. See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED

171 (2000).

51. See id.
52. See id.

53. See Brower v. State of Washington, 969 P.2d 42, 47 (Wash. Ct. App.
1998).

54. See id. at 48.
55. Morris, supra note 2, at 1042.
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He goes on to envision campaigns that involve "e-mail volleys attacking, parrying, and counter-thrusting up to the moment of Election Day morning. ' 56 This aspect of future campaigning can be
thought of as involving "push" media. Morris also depicts a future
aspect of electioneering that he calls the "voluntary campaign" 5in7
which citizens will only receive messages that they wish to hear.
He predicts, "[c]ampaigns will have to focus their attention on becoming sufficiently attractive to win the voters' attention rather than
mapping out uninvited intrusions into their lives." 58 This aspect of
campaigning involves "pull" media.
Whether or not push or pull media are involved, voters will only
wish to be involved in online politics if an adequate level of information privacy is provided. To understand why voter participation
in cyberspace politics will be closely affected by privacy concerns,
one requires a sense of information privacy's normative purpose.
Democratic social systems require information privacy because each
citizen, whether acting within a single social role or multiple roles,
requires some insulation from observation and influence. As the sociologist Robert Merton states, "[p]rivacy is not only a personal
predilection, though it may be that, too. It is a requirement of social
systems ... ."59 Information privacy is not derived from the state of
nature or an inborn capacity of autonomy, but from its essential relation to the health of a democratic society. It helps to form the society
in which we live and to shape our individual identities.
As I have elsewhere proposed, standards of information privacy
should be considered as normatively defining "information territories." 60 These multidimensional data preserves will insulate personal
data from different kinds of observation by different parties; these
territories will shape patterns of knowledge and ignorance of personal data. The function of these preserves is to prevent different
56. Id.

57. See id. at 1043.
58. Id.
59. ROBERT K. MERTON, ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SCIENCE 118 (Piotr
Sztompka ed., 1996).

60. See Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Codefor InternetPrivacy: Cyberspace Filters,Privacy Control, and FairInformation Practices,2000 WIS.
L. REv. 743, 761-62; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32
CONN. L. REv. 815, 834-43 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1658-66 (1999).
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kinds of "outing," that is, revelation of otherwise fully or partially
hidden aspects of one's life, before different audiences. After all,
decision making in a democracy depends on individuals who are anchored in a variety of social settings.
Morris's push and pull media on the Internet will upset the existing data preserves that American society has developed for personal information relating to politics. As a first example of how current privacy standards will be altered, federal election law requires
that federal campaigns collect information about donations they receive. 61 Accessing these data was once difficult. 62 Interested parties
were generally obliged to visit the Federal Election Commission's
(FEC's) office in downtown Washington, D.C. to view this information. These data are now increasingly available from multiple
sources on.the Internet. An op-ed article in the New York Times even
reported on a website that sorts political contributions by zip code,
which allows one63 to find out the political affiliations and activities of
one's neighbors.
As a second example of changes in the privacy balance, voter
profiles are increasingly collected and sold. One political consulting
firm engaged in this trade, Aristotle International, has compiled the
nation's largest voter database, which includes the names of 150
million Americans registered to vote.64 The Aristotle database is
precise enough to allow politicians to contact Democrats or Republicans in a given district between ages of forty-five and fifty-five who
own their homes and have annual incomes of more than $75,000.
Moreover, this company's database lists are sorted by characteristics
such as ethnicity and gender. Aristotle is also helping politicians
transmit campaign advertisements to specific voters using the

61. See 2 U.S.C. § 438 (1994).
62. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n (FEC) v. Legi-Tech, 967 F. Supp. 523,
535 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that a computerized database service that provides
subscribers with FEC information violated Federal Election Campaign Act
section prohibiting commercial use of FEC contribution information).
63. See Fred Bernstein, An Online Peek at Your Politics,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2000, at A35.
64. See Aaron Pressman, Voters for Sale, INDUSTRY STANDARD,
Nov. 6, 2000, available at http:/lwww.thestandard.comlarticleldisplay/
0,1151,19864,00.html.
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Internet.65 It is doing so by merging its database of offline activities
with e-mail addresses.
Morris predicts that the Internet will heighten participation in
voting through such means as targeted e-mails and websites attractive enough to gain our ongoing allegiance. Yet, the danger is that
people will further retreat from involvement in politics if Internet activities create a continuous, opaque process in which one's interests
and preferences are catalogued, stored, and shared with others. Indeed, information processing can become coercive of decision making itself when it undermines an individual's ability to make choices
about participation in social and political life. The Internet, in the
absence of the right kind of rules for privacy, will not have much
promise to become a space for participation in political life.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I have responded to Dick Morris's predictions that
the Internet will lead to cheaper elections, greater voter participation,
and a more direct form of democracy. In my judgment, electoral activity in cyberspace will help increase electoral expenditures, have
little effect on voter participation-apart from making it easier for
Internet "haves" to exercise the electoral franchise-and make it
possible for a new kind of top-down manipulation of referenda and
other processes of direct democracy. Moreover, the Internet will upset the existing privacy preserves that American society has developed for personal information relating to political life. The danger is
that the negative impact on information privacy will make individuals less willing to participate in politics.
After this pessimism, I wish to end this Essay on a positive note.
As I have noted earlier, the Internet is malleable, and the critical task
will be to shape cyberspace and the political process on it to avoid
negative results and gather positive results from any move to online
politics. As one indication of the kind of thought that is necessary,
Jerry Kang has proposed inventive ways to create zones in

65. See id. For an article about a database of Michigan voter profiles
maintained by a company called Practical Political Consulting, see Jodi Wilgoren, Getting a Lock on Michigan Voters, List by List, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2000, at A24.
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66
cyberspace that might have a positive impact on race relations.
Similar in this respect to the ideas of Mogel and Karlan, Kang points
to the potential value of virtual communities. 67 As this scholarship
indicates, the Internet, while not a cure-all for the political ills of the
United States, can help form part of a solution. It can help fulfill a
prediction made by both Dick Morris and Leonard Cohen; the Internet can help democracy come to the U.S.A.

66. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1131 (2000).
67. See id.; see also Moglen & Karlen, supra note 14, at 1100.

1088

LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW

[34:1071

